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Abstract
Regional quarantine policies, in which a portion of a population surrounding infec-
tions are locked down, are an important tool to contain disease. However, jurisdictional
governments – such as cities, counties, states, and countries – act with minimal coor-
dination across borders. We show that a regional quarantine policy’s effectiveness
depends upon whether (i) the network of interactions satisfies a balanced-growth con-
dition, (ii) infections have a short delay in detection, and (iii) the government has
control over and knowledge of the necessary parts of the network (no leakage of be-
haviors). As these conditions generally fail to be satisfied, especially when interactions
cross borders, we show that substantial improvements are possible if governments are
proactive: triggering quarantines in reaction to neighbors’ infection rates, in some cases
even before infections are detected internally. We also show that even a few lax gov-
ernments – those that wait for nontrivial internal infection rates before quarantining –
impose substantial costs on the whole system. Our results illustrate the importance of
understanding contagion across policy borders and offer a starting point in designing
proactive policies for decentralized jurisdictions.
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Introduction
Global problems, from climate change to disease control, are hard to address without policy
coordination across borders. In particular, pandemics, like COVID-19, are challenging to
contain because governments fail to coordinate efforts. Without vaccines or herd immunity,
governments have responded to infections by limiting constituents’ interactions in areas
where an outbreak exceeds a threshold of infections. Such regional quarantine policies are
used by towns, cities, counties, states, and countries, and trace to the days of the black
plague. Over the past 150 years, regional quarantines have been used to combat cholera,
diphtheria, typhoid, flus, polio, ebola, and COVID-19 [1, 2, 3, 4], but rarely with coordination
across borders.
Decentralized policies across jurisdictions have two major shortcomings. First, govern-
ments care primarily about their own citizens and do not account for how their infections
impact other jurisdictions: the resulting lack of coordination can lead to worse overall out-
comes than a global policy [5, 6, 7]. Second, some governments only pay attention to what
goes on within their borders, which leads them to under-forecast their own infection rates.
We examine three types of quarantine policies to understand the impact of non-coordination:
(i) those controlled by one actor with control of the whole society – “single regime policies,”
(ii) those controlled by separate jurisdictions that only react to internal infection rates –
“myopic jurisdictional policies,” and (iii) those controlled by separate jurisdictions that are
proactive and track infections outside of their jurisdiction as well as within when deciding
on when to quarantine – “proactive jurisdictional policies.”
We use a general model of contagion through a network to study these policies. We
first consider single regime policies. A government can quarantine everyone at once under a
“global quarantine,” but those are very costly (e.g., lost days of work). Less costly (in the
short run), and hence more common, alternatives are “regional quarantines” in which only
people within some distance of observed infections are quarantined. Regional quarantines,
however, face two challenges. First, many diseases are difficult to detect, because individuals
are either asymptomatically contagious (e.g., HIV, COVID-19) [8, 9, 10], or a government
lacks resources to quickly identify infections [11, 12]. Second, it may be infeasible to fully
quarantine a part of the network, because of difficulties in identifying whom to quarantine
or non-compliance by some people – by choice or necessity [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Either
way, tiny leakages can spread the disease.
We show that regional quarantines curb the spread of a disease if and only if: (i) there
is limited delay in observing infections, (ii) there is sufficient knowledge and control of the
network to prevent leakage of infection, and (iii) the network has a certain “balanced-growth”
structure. The failure of any of these conditions substantially limits quarantine effectiveness.
We then examine jurisdictional policies, which are regional quarantine policies conducted
by multiple, uncoordinated regimes. The regions that need to be quarantined cross borders,
leading to leakage that limits their effectiveness. As we show, myopic policies do much worse
than proactive ones, as they do not forecast the impact of neighboring infection rates on
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their own population. Moreover, a few lax jurisdictions, which wait for higher infection rates
before quarantining, substantially worsen outcomes for all jurisdictions.
A Model
Consider a large network of nodes (individuals). Our theory is asymptotic, applying as the
population grows (details in the SI). An infectious disease begins with an infection of a node
i0, the location of which is known, and expands via (directed) paths from i0.
In each discrete time period, the infection spreads from each currently infected node to
each of its susceptible contacts independently with probability p. A node is infectious for
θ periods, after which it recovers and is no longer susceptible, though our results extend to
the case in which a node can become susceptible again.
The disease may exhibit a delay of τ ≤ θ periods during which an infected and contagious
person does not test positive. This can be a period of asymptomatic infectiousness, a delay
in testing, or healthcare access [8, 10, 20, 11, 12, 21]. After that delay, the each infected
node’s infection is detected with probability α < 1 (for simplicity, in the first period after
the delay). α incorporates testing accuracy, availability, and decisions to test.
This framework nests the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model and its variations
including exposure, multiple infectious stages, and death [22, 23, 24, 18, 25], agent-based
models [26, 27, 28], and others.
Results
Baseline: an ideal setting
We begin by analyzing a single jurisdiction with complete control.
A (k, x)-regional policy is triggered once x or more infections are observed within distance
k from the seed node i0; at which point it quarantines all nodes within distance k+ 1 of the
seed for θ periods. This captures a commonly used policy where regions that are exposed to
the disease are shut down in response to detection. We give the policymaker the advantage
of knowing which node is the seed and study subsequent containment efforts. In practice,
the estimation of the infection origin is an additional challenge.
Whether a regional policy halts infection in this setting is fully characterized by what we
call growth-balance (formally defined in the SI). This requires that the network have large
enough expansion properties and that the expansion rate not drop too low in any part of
the network.
To better understand growth-balance, consider an example of a disease that is beginning
to spread with a reproduction number of 3.5 and such that one in ten cases are detected in a
timely manner (α = 0.1). First, consider a part of the network in which each infected person
infects 3.5 others on average. If we monitor nodes within distance k = 3 of an infected node,
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a “typical” chain of infection would lead to roughly 3.5+3.52+3.53 = 58.625 expected cases.
The chance that this goes undetected is tiny: 0.958.625 = 0.002. Next, suppose the infection
starts in part of the network where each infected person infects just one other, on average.
Now a chain of depth 3 leads to 1+1+1 = 3 infections. The chance that this spread remains
undetected is very high: 0.93 = 0.72.
Many different networks can lead to the same average reproduction number, but have
very different structures. If the distribution of reproduction numbers around the network
has no pockets in which it is too low, then it is highly likely that any early infection will
be detected before it goes beyond a distance of three away from the first infected node. If
instead, the distribution of reproduction numbers gives a nontrivial chance that the disease
starts out on a chain with lower reproduction numbers, like the 1, 1, 1, chain, then there is a
high chance that it can travel several steps before being detected. Given the short distances
in many networks [29, 30, 31], this allows it to be almost anywhere. Supplementary Figure
C.1 in the SI pictures a network that has a high average reproduction number, but is not
growth-balanced and allows the infection to travel far from the initially infected node without
detection.
In the SI (Theorem 1) we prove that, with no delays in detection and no leakage, a (k, x)-
regional policy halts infection among all nodes beyond distance k+1 from i0 with probability
approaching 1 (as the population grows) if and only if the network satisfies growth-balance.
Growth-balance is satisfied by many, but not all, sequences of random graph models,
provided that the average degree d satisfies dk → ∞ (Corollary 1, SI). Without growth
balance, a regional policy fails non-trivially even under idealized conditions.
The effectiveness of a regional policy breaks down, even if a network is growth-balanced,
once there is leakage (due to imperfect information, enforcement, or jurisdictional bound-
aries) or sufficient delay in detection.
Delays in Detection and Wider Quarantines
To understand how delays in detection affect a regional policy, consider two extremes. If the
delay is short relative to the infectious period, the policymaker can still anticipate the disease
and adjust by enlarging the area of the quarantine to include a buffer. An easy extension of
the above theorem is that a regional policy with a buffer works if and only if the network
is growth-balanced and the delay in detection is shorter than the diameter of the network
(Theorem 2, SI). Given that real-world networks have short average distances between nodes
[32], non-trivial delays in detection allow the disease to escape a regional quarantine.
Leakage
Next, we consider how leakage – inability to limit interactions [13] or mistakes in identifying
portions of a network to quarantine [17, 18] – diminishes the effectiveness of regional poli-
cies. Although minimizing leakage increases the chance that a regional quarantine will be
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successful, we show (Theorem 3, SI) that even a small amount of leakage leads to a nontrivial
probability that a regional policy will fail.
Jurisdictions and Leakage
We can use the results from regional quarantines as a starting point to understand jurisdic-
tional policies. For instance, leakage generally applies when interactions cross jurisdictions.
Figure 1 pictures two jurisdictions that fail to nicely tessellate the network.
Figure 1: Inconsistency of Jurisdictions and Distances
l
Distance l 0 1 2 3 4
Jurisdiction l la b
(a) Jurisdictions with interactions that do not align
l
Distance l 0 1 2 3 4
Jurisdiction l la b
(b) Figure 1a, but based on distance from infection
Figure 1: Nodes in two jurisdictions do not align with the distances from the initial infection.
In Panel (a), the nodes are presented in a geographic sense, within their jurisdictions, and the
interaction network does not comply with the jurisdictional boundaries. In Panel B, we show the
network as a function of directed distance from the initial infection. A coordinated quarantine of
distance 2 over the network in Panel (b) could contain the infection; however, if it is only executed
by the infected nodes jurisdiction in panel (a) then it would fail for cross-jurisdictional connections.
Given leakage across jurisdictional borders, unless policies are fully coordinated across
jurisdictions, our theoretical results indicate that they will fail to contain infections.
Simulations
The theory provides insights into the various hurdles that quarantine policies face, but does
not provide insight into how well different types policies will fare in slowing infection and at
what costs.
To explore this, we simulate a contagion on a network of 140000 nodes that mimics real-
world data [33, 34, 35, 21]. These simulations illustrate our theoretical results and also show
the improvements that proactive policies provide relative to myopic ones. The results are
robust to choices of parameters (SI).
The network is divided into 40 locations, each with a population of 3500. We generate
the network using a geographic stochastic block model (SI). The probability of interacting
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declines with distance. The average degree is 20.49 and nodes have 79.08% of their inter-
actions within their own locations and 20.92% outside of their location (calibrated to data
from India and the United States, including data collected during COVID-19 [33, 34, 35, 21],
SI). We set the basic reproduction rate R0 = 3.5 to mimic COVID-19 [36], and θ = 5 and
α = 0.1 ([20, 37, 38], SI).
The simulated network is fairly symmetric in degree and therefore approximates satisfying
growth-balance, and thus the attention in our simulations is focused on leakage and detection
delay.
Before introducing jurisdictions, we first illustrate the effects of leakage as well as delays
in detection. In Figure 2, the entire network is governed by a single policymaker using a
(k, x) = (3, 1)-regional quarantine.
Figure 2a shows the outcomes for no delay in detection nor any leakage. Consistent with
Theorem 1 the policy is effective: on average 277 nodes per million are infected (0.028% of the
population), with 803956 node-days of quarantine per million nodes. Figure 2b introduces
a delay in detection. With a delay of τ = 3, infections increase, with 2256 nodes per
million eventually infected (0.23% of the population) and 2301414 node-days of quarantine
per million nodes. Adding a buffer to correspond to the detection delay effectively makes the
regional policy global, as the buffered region contains 99.98% of the population on average.
Figure 2c adds leakage to the setup of Figure 2b, making only 95% of the intended nodes
quarantined. The number of cumulative infections per million nodes increases to 5138 (0.50%
of the population). The leakage increases the number of quarantined node-days to 6478055
per million nodes.
Jurisdictional Policies
We now introduce jurisdictions to the same network as before, and each location becomes
its own jurisdiction.
We compare two types of jurisdictional policies. In myopic policies each jurisdiction
quarantines based entirely on internal infections. In proactive policies, jurisdictions track
infections in other jurisdictions and predict their own – possibly undetected – infections and
base their quarantines off of predicted infections (calculation details in SI). In both cases, if
a jurisdiction enters quarantine, all links within and to the jurisdiction are removed.
Figure 3 illustrates the improvement a proactive policy offers relative to myopic internal
jurisdictional policies. In Figure 3a, jurisdictions use myopic policies, while in Figure 3b
jurisdictions use proactive policies. In the myopic case, there are 118447 infections per million
nodes (11.85% of the population), with 65634600 person-day quarantines per million nodes.
Multiple waves are common: 67.4% of jurisdictions have multiple quarantines. Proactive
quarantining dramatically improves outcomes (Figure 3b): only 6300 nodes per million are
infected (0.630% of the population), with 37816130 person-day quarantines per million nodes.
Multiple shutdowns are less frequent: 56.9% of jurisdictions quarantine more than once.
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Figure 2: The Impact of Detection Delay and Leakage
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(a) (k, x) = (3, 1)-quarantine with no delay in detec-
tion and no leakage
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(b) (k, x) = (3, 1)-quarantine policy with a detection
delay of 3 periods
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(c) (k, x) = (3, 1)-quarantine policy with a detection
delay of 3 periods and leakage
Figure 2: We picture daily infections and cumulative recoveries under three scenarios. The entire
network is governed by a single policymaker using a (k, x) = (3, 1)-regional quarantine. In Panel
2a, there is no detection delay and no leakage. In Panel 2b, we introduce a detection delay of τ = 3.
This represents the 3 day pre-symptomatic window during which an infected node can transmit, as
well as an expected delay in seeking healthcare and testing upon symptom onset ([20], SI). Panel
2c adds leakage of  = 0.05 to the setup of Panel 2b. For each figure, we simulate 10000 times on
the same network with random initial infections, and present the average number of infections and
recovered people over time, scaled per million.
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Figure 3: The Effectiveness of Myopic vs Proactive Policies
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(a) Each jurisdiction quarantines once it observes
any infections internally, ignores other jurisdictions
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(c) 36 jurisdictions quarantine once observing any
internal infections, 4 lax jurisdictions only quarantine
once they reach 5 internal infections
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(d) 36 jurisdictions quarantine proactively by esti-
mating internal infections based on observation of
other jurisdictions, 4 lax jurisdictions only quaran-
tine once they reach 5 internal infections
Figure 3: We picture daily infections and cumulative recoveries under four quarantine policies
with 40 jurisdictions. When a jurisdiction quarantines, it locks down the entire jurisdiction. In
Panel 3a, all jurisdictions use a myopic internal policy. In Panel 3b, all jurisdictions use a proactive
policy. In Panel 3c, we implement the same policies as Panel 3a, but have four lax jurisdictions that
use x = 5 (0.14% of the jurisdiction population) instead of x = 1 (SI). Panel 3d has 36 jurisdictions
with proactive policies and four with lax policies. For each figure, we simulate 10000 times on
the same network with random initial infections, and present the average number of infections and
recovered people over time, scaled per million.
Lax Jurisdictions
Finally, we also add a few “lax” jurisdictions to the setting. These are jurisdictions that are
myopic and have a high threshold of internal infections before quarantining. We examine
how these few lax jurisdictions worsen the outcomes for all jurisdictions.
In Figures 3c and 3d, four lax jurisdictions react only to infections within their own
borders and wait until they have detected five infections before quarantining (Simulation
Details, SI). Figure 3c shows the outcomes when the remaining 36 jurisdictions using my-
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opic internal strategies, while in Figure 3d the remaining 36 jurisdictions using proactive
strategies. Comparing Figures 3a to 3c, infections are much worse under the myopic inter-
nal policies. 209389 nodes per million are infected (20.9% of the population), and 72.8%
of regions shut down multiple times. Of the infections in Figure 3c, 84.2% happen in low
threshold-jurisdictions. Comparing Figures 3b to 3d shows that things deteriorate less for the
proactive jurisdictional policies. The 27312 total infections per million nodes (2.73% of the
population) is well below either set of myopic policies: 67.4% of jurisdictions have multiple
quarantines; and 73.4% of the infections in Figure 3d happen in the proactive regions.
Figure 4a displays the dynamics of quarantines for each of the policy configurations from
Figure 3, and Figure 4b displays the number of person-day infections versus the number of
person-day quarantines.
Global quarantines (closing the entire network at once) and single-jurisdiction regional
quarantines (with leakage) do the best on both dimensions. Once jurisdictions are intro-
duced, proactive jurisdictions quarantine earlier and have fewer recurrences than myopic
jurisdictions. Lax jurisdictions cause an overall higher number of quarantines, over a longer
time. The proactive jurisdictional policy trades off more quarantine days for substantially
fewer infection days compared to the myopic internal policy, but proactive policies do signif-
icantly better than myopic policies on both dimensions when mixed with jurisdictions using
lax policies.
Figure 4: The Impact and Costs of Quarantine Policies with and without Lax
Jurisdictions
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 250 500 750 1000
Time
All Myopic
All Proactive
Myopic w/ lax neighbors
Proactive w/ lax neighbors
Fraction of regions under quarantine
(a) Dynamics of quarantines in each of the policy
configurations
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Single jurisdiction, regional quarantine
Multiple jurisdictions, myopic
Multiple jurisdictions, proactive
Multiple jurisdictions, myopic 
 w/ lax neighbors
Multiple jurisdictions, proactive 
 w/ lax neighbors
Infected Person Periods
(b) Person-day infections vs. person-day quarantines
(per million)
Figure 4: Figure 4a displays the dynamics of quarantines for each of the policy configurations.
Figure 4b plots the number of person-day infections (per million) against the number of person-
day quarantines (per million) for six key policy scenarios. The global policy does the best on
both dimensions, and the second best is the single-jurisdiction myopic strategy (which does worse
than the global because of leakage). With 40 jurisdictions, both proactive policies outperform the
internal, myopic policies. By far the worst, on both dimensions, is the internal, myopic policy with
some lax jurisdictions. These results come from the same solutions that produce figures 2 and 3.
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DISCUSSION
We have shown that regional quarantine policies are likely to fail unless leakage and delays in
detection are limited. Multiple jurisdictions using independent policies are even less effective,
as leakage occurs across jurisdictional borders. We have also shown that there are substantial
improvements from proactive policies, and that a few lax jurisdictions greatly worsen the
outcomes for all jurisdictions.
Jurisdictional policies tend to be aimed at the welfare of their internal populations, yet
the external effects are large. Our results underscore the importance of timely information
sharing and coordination in both the design and execution of policies across jurisdictional
boundaries [39]. The results also underscore the global importance of aiding poor jurisdic-
tions. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that a lack of coordination across boundaries has
been damaging in the case of COVID-19 [6].
The use of masks (decreasing p), social distancing (decreasing d), and increasing testing
(increasing α), all help attenuate contagion, but unless they maintain the reproduction
number below one, the problems identified here remain. Even tiny fractions of interactions
across boundaries are enough to lead to spreading in large populations. With modern inter-
and intranational trade being a sizable portion of all economies, such interaction is difficult
to avoid. Nonetheless, our analysis offers insights into managing infections at smaller scales;
e.g., within schools, sports, and businesses. By creating a network of interactions that is
highly modular, keeping cross-modular interactions to a minimum and making sure that they
are highly traceable, together with aggressive testing (especially of cross-module actors), one
can come close to satisfying the conditions of our first theorem.
Our results also suggest caution in using statistical models to identify regions to quaran-
tine. Although contagion models are helpful for informing policy about the magnitude of an
epidemic and broad dynamics, the models can give false comfort in our ability to engage in
highly targeted policies, whose results can be influenced by small deviations from idealized
assumptions. Our growth-balance condition also points out that not all parts of a network
are equal in their potential for undetected transmission. In places where the reproduction
number is lower, so is the probability of observing outbreaks, enabling undetected leakage
of infections.
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Supplementary Material
Interacting Regional Policies in Containing a Disease
by Chandrasekhar, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Jackson, Thau
A Modeling An Epidemic and Quarantine Policy
The Model
People and Interactions
There are n > 1 nodes (individuals) in an unweighted, and possibly directed, network.
We study the course of a disease through the network. Time is discrete, with periods
indexed by t ∈ N. An initial infected node, indexed by i0 ∈ V , is the only node infected at
time 0. We call this node the seed.
We track the network via neighborhoods that expand outwards via (directed) paths from
i0. Let Nk be all the nodes who are at (directed) distance k from node i0. We use nk to
denote the cardinality of Nk.
For any node in j ∈ Nk′ , for k′ < k, let nj be the number of its direct descendants and njk
be the number of its (possibly indirect) descendants in Nk that are reached by never passing
beyond distance k from i0.
All unweighted network models are admitted here. Additionally, all results extend di-
rectly to any weighted model in which weights are bounded above and below (e.g., proba-
bilities of interaction). Note also, that the network can be directed or undirected.
The infection process proceeds as follows. In every time period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, an infected
node i transmits the disease to each of i’s neighbors independently with probability p. A
newly infected node is infectious for θ ≥ 1 periods after which the node recovers and is never
again infectious. The model can easily be extended to accommodate renewed susceptibility.
There may be a delay in the ability to detect the disease. The number of periods of
delay is given by τ with 0 ≤ τ ≤ θ. Delay is a general term that can capture many things.
For example, it can correspond to (a) asymptomatic infectiousness, (b) a delay in accessing
health care given the onset of an infectious period, (c) any delay in the administration of
testing, and so on.
In the first period of an infected node’s infectious period – after delay – there is a prob-
ability α that the policymaker detects it as being infected. So, potential detection happens
exactly once during the first period in which the node can be detected. Detection is indepen-
dently and identically distributed. Our results are easily extended to have a random period
for detection after the delay.
Finally, the policymaker may face some error in their knowledge of the network. This
can come from their inability to enforce exactly the interactions they wish to allow or limit,
this can come from random variation in data collected to estimate interaction networks, or
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this can come from misspecification. If there is error, we will track a share  of nodes that
are within a k-neighborhood of the seed but are estimated by the policymaker to be outside
the k-neighborhood.
Regional Quarantine Policy
Let regional policy of distance k and threshold x be such that once there are at least x
infections (other than the seed) detected within distance k from the initial seed, then all
nodes within distance k+1 of i0 are quarantined for at least θ periods. A quarantine implies
all connections between nodes are severed to avoid any further transmission and the infection
waits out its duration θ and dies out.
Implicit in this definition is that a quarantine is not instantaneous, but that infected
people could have infected their friends before being shut down, which is why the nodes
at distance k + 1 are quarantined. All the results below extend if we assume that it is
instantaneous, but with quarantines moved back one step and path lengths in definitions
correspondingly adjusted.
We have assumed the policymaker knows the “seed,” for simplicity - and which may take
some time in reality. This provides an advantage to the policymaker, but we see substantial.
containment failures despite this advantage.
Growth Balance
In order to conduct asymptotic analysis, a useful device to study the probabilities of events
in question in large networks, we study a sequence of networks G(n) with n → ∞ and
an associated sequence of parameters (α, p, τ, θ, k) = (α(n), p(n), τ(n), θ(n), k(n)). In what
follows when we drop the index n, and it is implied unless otherwise stated.
Consider a network and a distance k from the initially infected node i0. A path of
potential infection to k + 2 is a sequence of nodes i0, i1, . . . i` with i` ∈ Nk+1, ij+1 being a
direct descendant of ij for each j ∈ {0, . . . , `−1}, and for which i` has a descendant in Nk+2.
Consider a sequence of networks and k(n)s. We say that there are bounded paths of
potential infection to k(n) + 2 if there exists some finite M and for each n there is a path
of potential infection to k(n) + 2, i0, i1, . . . i` of length less than M , with n
j < M for every
j ∈ {0, . . . , `− 2}.
We say that a sequence of networks is growth-balanced relative to some k(n) if there are
no bounded paths of potential infection to k(n) + 2.
Growth balance is essentially a condition that requires a minimum bound of expansion
along all paths from some initial infection. The intuition behind the condition is clear: in
order to be sure to detect an infection, within distance k of the seed, it has to be that many of
the nodes within distance k have been exposed to the disease by the time it reaches distance
k. What is ruled out is a relatively short path that gets directly to that distance without
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having many nodes be exposed along that path.1
Supplementary Figure C.1 presents an illustration of a network that is not growth-
balanced.
Supplementary Figure C.1: Growth Balance
(a) Regional Policy Fails (b) Regional Policy Succeeds
Figure C.1: Panel (a) demonstrates the possible failure of growth-balance. The infection escapes
up the line undetected beyond the quarantine radius. If the infection happens to spread downwards,
as in Panel (b), it is much more likely to be detected. However, that only happens with some
moderate probability in this network, and so growth balance fails.
Results
A Benchmark: No Delay in Detection; Perfect Information and Enforcement
We begin with a benchmark case in which there is no delay in detection (τ = 0) and the
policymaker can completely enforce a quarantine at some distance k + 1.2
We allow the size of the quarantine region k to depend on n in any way, as the theorem
still applies. We work with an arbitrary but fixed threshold x, in order to allow infections
to be detected. What is important is that x not grow too rapidly, as otherwise there is no
chance of observing that many infections within some distance of the seed.3
1This is very different from conditions that concern long paths within short distances, such as [40], as
ours is ruling out short paths with low expansion.
2Note that this requires knowledge of the neighborhood structure around the seed node, but no other
knowledge of the network by a policy maker.
3 The theorem extends to allow x to grow with n, provided the growth is sufficiently slow, and then that
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Theorem 1. Consider any sequence of networks and associated k(n) < K(n) − 1 where
K(n) is the maximum k for which nk > 0;
4, such that each node in Nk(n)+1 has at least one
descendent at distance k(n) + 2, and let x be any fixed positive integer. Let the sequence of
associated diseases have α(n) and p(n) bounded away from 0 and 1,5 no delay in detection,
and any θ(n) ≥ 1. A regional quarantining policy of distance k(n) and threshold x halts all
infections past distance k(n) + 1 with a probability tending to 1 if and only if the sequence is
growth-balanced with respect to k(n).
Note that the growth-balance condition implies that the number of nodes within distance
k(n) from i0 must be growing without bound. Theorem 1 thus implies that in order for a
regional policy to work, the region must be growing without bound, and also must satisfy a
particular balance condition.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the first part, note that if the infection never reaches distance
k then the result holds directly since it can then not go beyond k + 1. We show that if the
sequence of networks is growth-balanced relative to k, then conditional upon an infection
reaching level k with the possibility of reaching k + 2 within two periods, the probability
that it infects more than x nodes within distance k before any nodes beyond k tends to
1. Suppose that infection reaches some node at distance k that can reach a node in Nk+1.
Consider the corresponding sequence of paths of infected nodes i0, i1, . . . i` with i` ∈ Nk+1,
ij+1 being a direct descendant of ij for each j ∈ {0, . . . , `− 1}, and note that by assumption
i` has a descendant in Nk+2. By the growth-balance condition, for any M , there is a large
enough n for which either the length of the path is longer than M or else there is at least
one ij with j ≤ `− 2 along the path that has more than M descendants. In the latter case,
the probability that ij has more than x descendants who become infected and are detected
is at least 1 − FM,m(x) where FM,m is the binomial distribution with M draws each with
probability m, where pα > m for some fixed m. Given that x and m are fixed, this tends to
probability 1 as M grows. In the former case, the sequence exceeds length M , all of which
are infected and so given that α is bounded below, the probability that at least x of them
are detected goes to 1 as M grows. In both cases, as n grows, the minimal M across such
paths of potential infection to k+ 1 grows without bound, and so the probability that there
are at least x infections that are detected by the time that i`−1 is reached tends to 1 as n
grows.
To prove the converse, suppose that the network is not growth-balanced. Consider a
sequence of bounded paths of potential infection to k+2, with associated sequences of nodes
i0, i1, . . . i` of length less than M with i` ∈ Nk+1, ij+1 being a direct descendant of ij for
each j ∈ {0, . . . , ` − 1}, with nj < M for every j ∈ {0, . . . , ` − 2}, and for which i` has a
descendant in Nk+2. The probability that each of the nodes i1, . . . i`−2 becomes infected and
growth-balance condition becomes more complicated, as the M in that definition adjusts with the rate of
growth of x.
4Otherwise, it is actually a global policy.
5The cases of p or α equal to 1 are degenerate.
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no other nodes are infected within distance k− 1, and that all infected nodes are undetected
is at least (p(1−α)(1−p)M)M . This is fixed and so bounded away from 0. This implies that
probability that the infection gets to nodes at distance k, and i`−1 in particular, without
any detections is bounded below. Thus, there is a probability bounded below of reaching
i` before any detections, and then by the time the quarantine is enacted, there is at least
a p times this probability that it escapes past Nk+1, which is thus also bounded away from
0.
We note that Theorem 1 admits essentially all sequences of (unweighted) networks. Thus,
for every type of network, one can determine whether a regional policy of some k, x will
succeed or fail. The only thing that one needs to check is growth-balance. If it is satisfied,
a regional policy works, and otherwise it will fail with nontrivial probability.
The following corollary details the implications of the theorem for some prominent ran-
dom network models.
Corollary 1.
1. For a sequence of block models (with Erdos-Renyi as a special case),6 a regional policy
with a bounded k has a probability going to 1 of halting the disease on the randomly
realized network if and only if the seed node’s expected out degree d is such that dk →∞.
2. For a regular expander graph with outdegree d, a regional policy works if and only if
the expansion rate dk →∞.
3. For a regular lattice of degree d, a regional policy works if and only if dk →∞.
4. For a rewired lattice with a fraction links that are randomly rewired, a regional policy
with a bounded k has a probability going to 1 of halting the disease on the randomly
realized network if and only if dk →∞.
5. For a sequence of random networks with a scale-free degree distribution, a regional
policy works (with probability 1) if and only if k →∞.
Thus, whether a regional policy works in almost any network model requires that either
the degree of almost all nodes grows without bound, or else the size of the quarantine grows
without bound. For a scale free distribution, there is always a nontrivial probability on small
degrees, and hence in order for a regional policy to work, the size of the neighborhood must
grow without bound.
In practice, even very sparse networks will have a large dk (e.g., if people have hundreds
of contacts, 1003 is already a million and even with a very low α many infections will
6Consider a sequence of block models such that the ratio of expected out degree of a node in one neigh-
borhood compared to another in some other block cannot grow without bound.
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be detected within a few steps of the initial node).7 What the growth-balance condition
rules out is that some nontrivial part of the network have neighborhoods with many fewer
contacts - so there cannot be people who have just a few contacts, since that will allow for
a nontrivial probability of undetected escape (e.g., 23 = 8 and so with only 8 infections, it
is possible that none are detected and the disease escapes beyond 3 steps). As many real-
world network structures have substantial heterogeneity, with some people having very low
numbers of interactions, such an escape becomes possible even under idealized assumptions
of no delay in detection and no leakage [41, 42, 43, 44, 45].
Delay in Detection
The detection delay, τ , is distributed over the support {1, . . . , τmax}. This includes degener-
ate distributions with τmax being the maximal value of the support with positive mass. The
policymaker may or may not know τmax and we study both cases. The latter is important as
in practice we estimate delay periods so there is bound to be uncertainty. When τ is known,
we can simply say τ = τmax.
Let a regional policy with trigger k and threshold x and buffer h be such that once there
are at least x infections detected within distance k + h from the initial seed, then all nodes
within distance k + h+ 1 of i0 are quarantined/locked down for at least θ periods.
There are two differences between this definition of regional policy from the one considered
before. First, it is triggered by infections within distance k+ h (not within distance k), and
it also has a buffer in how far the quarantine extends beyond the k-th neighborhood.
We extend the definition of growth balance to account for buffers.
Consider a network and a distance k from the initially infected node i0 and an h ≥ 1. A
path of potential infection to k + h+ 2 is a sequence of nodes i0, i1, . . . i` with i` ∈ Nk+h+1,
ij+1 being a direct descendant of ij for each j ∈ {0, . . . , `− 1}.
Consider a sequence of networks, n, and associated k(n), h(n). We say that there are
bounded paths of potential infection to k(n) + h(n) + 2 if there exists some finite M and
for each n there is a path of potential infection to k + h+ 2, i0, i1, . . . i` of length less than
M , with nj < M for every j ∈ {0, . . . , ` − h − 2}. We say that a sequence of networks is
growth-balanced relative to some k(n) and buffers h(n) if there are no bounded paths of
potential infection to k(n) + h(n) + 2.
Theorem 2. Consider any sequence of networks and k(n) < K(n) − h − 1 where K(n) is
the maximum k for which nk > 0, such that each node in Nk′ for k
′ > k has at least one
descendent at distance k′ + 1, and let x be any fixed positive integer. Let the sequence of
associated diseases have α(n) and p(n) bounded away from 0 and 1, θ(n) ≥ 1, and have a
detection delay distributed over some set {1, . . . , τmax} with τmax > 1 (with probability on
τmax bounded away from 0).8 A regional policy with trigger k(n), threshold x, and buffer
7This is still extremely sparse, as having 100 contacts out of millions or billions of potential other nodes
is a small fraction.
8A special case is in which τmax is known.
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τmax halts all infections past distance k(n) + τmax+1 with a probability tending to 1 if and
only if the sequence is growth-balanced with respect to k(n).
The Proof of Theorem 2 is a straightforward extension of the previous proof and so it is
omitted.
This result shows several things. First, if the detection delay is small relative to the
diameter of the graph, one can use a regional quarantine policy – adjusted for the detection
delay – along the lines of that from Theorem 1 and ensure no further spread. This is true
even if the period is stochastic as long as the upper bound is known to be small.
Second, and in contrast, if the detection delay is large compared to the diameter of the
graph, then a regional policy is insufficient. By the time infections are observed, it is too
late to quarantine a subset of the graph. This condition will tend to bind in the case of real
world networks, as they exhibit small world properties and have small diameters [30, 31].
As a result, even short detection delays may correspond to rapidly moving wavefronts that
spread undetected.
Leakage in the Quarantine
Next we turn to the case of in which there is some leakage in the quarantine, which may
come for a variety of reasons. The policymaker may have measurement error in knowing the
network structure of the network and who should be quarantined. Second, and distinctly,
the policymaker may be unable to control some nodes or interactions. Third, the network
may leak across jurisdictions and some nodes within distance k of i0 may be outside of the
policymaker’s jurisdiction.
To keep the analysis uncluttered, we assume no detection delay, but the arguments extend
directly to the delay case with the appropriate buffer.
Theorem 3. Consider any sequence of networks. Let the sequence of associated diseases
have α and p bounded away from 0 and 1, and be such that θ ≥ 1, with no detection delay.
Consider any k(n) < K − 1 where K is the maximum k for which nk > 0, suppose that
each node in Nk(n) has at least one descendent at distance k(n) + 1, and let x be any positive
integer.
Suppose that a random share of εn of nodes within distance k of i0 are not included in
a regional quarantine policy and connected to nodes of distance greater than k + 1 – because
of a lack of jurisdiction, misclassification by a policymaker, or lack of complete control over
people’s behaviors. Then:
1. If εn = o((
∑
k′≤k nk′)
−1) and the network is growth-balanced, then a regional policy of
distance k and threshold x halts all infections past distance k + 1 with a probability
tending to 1.
2. If εn ≥ min[1/x, η] for all n for some η > 0 or the network is not growth-balanced,
then a regional policy of distance k(n) and threshold x fails to halt all infections past
distance k(n) + 1 with a probability bounded away from 0.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Part 1 follows from the fact that if εn = o((
∑
k′≤k nk′)
−1) then the
probability of having all nodes in Nk correctly identified as being in Nk tends to 1, and then
Theorem 1 can be applied.
For Part 2, suppose that some x infections are detected. The probability that at least
one of them is misclassified is at least 1 − (1 − εn)x. Given that εn ≥ min[1/x, η] for any
η > 0, it follows that (1 − εn)x is bounded away from 1. There is a probability bounded
away from 0 that at least one of the infected nodes is misclassified, and not subject to the
quarantine, and connected to a node outside of distance k + 1.
The theorem implies that the effectiveness of a regional policy is sensitive to any small
fixed ε amount of leakage.
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B Simulation Details
To illustrate the processes described in the main text, we run several simulations. First,
we construct a large network with many jurisdictions. We directly study the content of
the theorems with several versions of (k, x) quarantines with an SIR infection process on a
network. We use the same process and network to show the issues with regional containment,
studying regional and adaptive policies.
Network Model
We model real world network structure as follows.
1. There are L locations distributed uniformly at random on the unit sphere.
Each location has a population of m nodes with a total of n = mL nodes in the
network.
2. The linking rates across locations are given as in a spatial model [41, 48]. The proba-
bility of nodes i ∈ ` and j ∈ `′ for locations ` 6= `′ linking depends only on the locations
of the two nodes and declines in distance:
q`,`′ = exp(a+ b · dist(`, `′))
where dist(`, `′) is the distance between the two locations on the sphere and a, b < 0.
Every interaction between every pair of nodes is drawn independently from the observed
spatial distribution, with distances being along the surface of the unit sphere.
3. The linking patterns within a location are given as in a mixture of random geometric
(RGG) [42] and Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graphs [49]. Specifically, as spheres are
locally Euclidean, we model nodes in a location (e.g., in a city) as residing in a square
in the tangent space to the location. The probability that two nodes within a location
link declines in their distance in this square.
We set dRGG as the desired degree from the the RGG. Nodes are uniformly distributed
on the unit square [0, 1]2, and links are formed between nodes within radius r` [42]. To
obtain the desired degree we set:
r` =
√
dRGG
m`pi
.
The remaining links within location are drawn identically and independently with
probability
pi =
d` − dRGG
m`
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Where d` is the desired average degree for all nodes within location `.
4. Next, we uniformly add links to create a small world effect, with identical and inde-
pendently distributed probability s = 1
cn
, where c is an arbitrary constant and n is the
total number of nodes in the network [29].
5. Finally, we designate a single location as a “hub,” to emulate the idea that certain
metro areas may have more connections to all other regions. To do so, we select a
hub uniformly at random and add links independently and identically distributed with
probability h from the hub location to every other location.
We first take L = 40 and m = 3500 for all locations. We set a = −4 and b = −15. Next,
we set d` = 15.5, and dRGG = 13.5 for all locations. Next, we set c = 2. Finally, we set
h = 2.85 × 10−6. This process results in a graph that emulates real world networks in the
United States and India [33, 34, 35, 21]. This includes data from India during the COVID-19
lockdowns about interactions within six feet, meaning that it is conservative [21].
We fix a graph to use in all versions of the simulations. The network we generate is
sparse, clustered, and has small average distances, as in real world data.
Supplementary Table 1: Graph Statistics
Property Value
Average Degree 20.49
Average Local Clustering Coefficient 0.208
Diameter 9
Average Path Length 5.33
Finally, we recalculate the connection probability matrix to accurately reflect rates of
connection across regions, which we call q.
Disease Process
We set parameters as follows: the duration of infection is θ = 5, detection delay (when
incorporated) is τ = 3, and set thresholds x for quarantine based on the simulation type.
We set transmission probability p as
p = 1−
(
1− R0
d¯
) 1
θ
where d¯ is the mean degree. We take R0 = 3.5, based on estimates of COVID-19 [36].
Cases are detected i.i.d. with rate α, which we define as
α = P(symptomatic) · P(Tested) · P(Test Positive|Truly Positive)
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We take the symptomatic rate as 43.2% [56], and the power of the test as 79% [57].
Following estimates from the literature (5-15%), we set α = 0.1 [37, 38]. So, the detection
rate is roughly 1 in 3. In the simulations, each node is either detected or not during the first
period in which it can be detected, and no information comes after that. When τ = 0, any
detection occurs as soon as they are infected and when τ > 0 this happens in the τ + 1th
period of infection.
As outlined in the main text, we begin by using θ = 5 and τ = 3 [20, 37, 38, 61].
Simulation Progression
Each time period in the simulation progresses in four parts, which happen sequentially. The
simulations run as follows:
1. The policy maker sees the detected infections from the previous period, and calculates
if a quarantine is necessary in the next period.
2. The disease progresses for a period. This includes new infections and recoveries.
3. Infected nodes that have just finished their detection delay of τ periods are indepen-
dently detected with probability α.
4. New quarantines are enacted based on decisions made in part one of the process.
Quarantines that have taken place for θ periods end.
A node that becomes infected in period t with a detection delay of τ and total disease
length θ, is tested in period t + τ , results are processed in t + τ + 1, and they will be
quarantined (if necessary) starting at the end of t + τ + 1 (under the fourth item above).
This means that they have τ + 1 time periods during which they can infect other nodes. For
instance, if τ = 0 this allows a node that becomes infected but (that was not already under
quarantine for other reasons) one opportunity to infect others. This process reflects that
neither detection nor quarantining of individuals (or jurisdictions) happens instantaneously.
In addition, we stipulate that the seed node, i0 is not counted in the quarantining testing and
calculations. This is meant to reflect that it may be unclear whether the disease is spreading
or not. Nodes that are detected are marked as such until recovery.
Containment Policies
A random node i0 is selected and the epidemic begins there. We study the epidemic curve,
the number total node-days of infection, and the number of node-days of quarantine for a
variety of containment strategies.
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(k, x) Policies
We examine a number of scenarios using the (k, x) policy model outlined in Theorems 1-3.
In the case that the quarantine fails, but there are infections outside of the quarantine
radius, the policy maker deals with them individually. The policy maker treats each detected
case outside of the initial quarantine as a new seed, and immediately quarantines all nodes
with the same radius as the initial quarantine.
Begin by using a simple objective function to find the optimal threshold for triggering
the initial quarantine. We minimize a linear combination of the number of infected person
periods and quarantined person periods. For all linear combinations where some weight is
given to both terms, the optimal threshold is x = 1. The logic is as follows: if the initial
quarantine is successful, the number of quarantined person periods will be fixed and also
the minimum number of quarantined person periods. Therefore, the problem reduces to
minimizing the number of infections, which is done by setting x = 1.
We study three versions of a (k, x) policy. First, we simulate (k, x) = (3, 1) with no
detection delay. Then, we incorporate a detection delay of τ = 3, still using a policy of
(k, x) = (3, 1) with no buffer. Lastly, we study a (3, 1) policy with no buffer and enforcement
failures. In this case, a fraction  = 0.05 of nodes do not ever quarantine.
Global Quarantine Policy
A global quarantine policy imagines the state as an actor which quarantines every node for
θ periods when more than x = 1 infections are detected globally. We study this in the case
with a detection delay, to compare to the (k, x), regional, jurisdiction based, and proactive
policies.
Myopic-Internal and Proactive Quarantine Policies
For both the myopic-internal and proactive policies, we take each location as a single juris-
diction.
Myopic Internal Quarantine Policies. Jurisdictions respond only to detections within
their own borders, setting x independently of one another. In addition, states act indepen-
dently: jurisdictions do not take detected infections outside of their borders into account.
We set x = 1 for all jurisdictions, the most conservative possible threshold unless otherwise
specified.
Proactive Quarantine Policies. We examine a more sophisticated approach to deciding
when to quarantine. With this policy, each jurisdiction decides to quarantine based on not
only defections within their borders, but within neighboring jurisdictions as well. In each
period, each jurisdiction ` calculates their expected detected infections w` as follows:
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w`,t = max{w`,t−1 + y`,t − r`,t, z`,t}
We use y`,t to denote the number of expected new infections in region ` at time t, and
use r`,t to denote the number of expected recoveries in ` at t. Each state calculates y`,t as:
y`,t = p
∑
`′ s.t. `′ not quarantined at t-1
m`′q`,`′w`′,t−1
The summation includes the term for spread from ` to still within `. If ` is quarantined
at time t, then y`,t = 0. Expected recovery at each period r`,t is calculated as:
r`,t = w`,t−θ − w`,t−θ−1 + r`,t−θ.
Finally, we set w`,t < 0.01 to be zero, to avoid implementation issues with floating point
calculations. Setting a lower value to truncate at would improve the performance of the
proactive jurisdiction policies, as they would be more sensitive to detected cases in other
jurisdictions.
Uniform and Lax Policies We run two simulation variants for both the proactive and
internally-based policy: one in which all states are as conservative as possible, setting x = 1
and a second in which four regions set a higher threshold of x = 5; in the proactive case,
these lax regions also act myopically, following the internal jurisdiction-based policy.
We choose x = 5 to simulate lax thresholds. In the United States, New York state
issued a stay at home order when 0.07% of the state population was infected, which scaled
to our populations of 3500 that is equivalent to a threshold of 2.73 [62, 63]. When scaled
to match our population of 3500, Florida began re-opening with a threshold of 6.15, and
some countries never locked down [64, 63, 65]. In our stylized model, quarantines are more
aggressive as they cut contact completely.
Results and Sensitivity Analysis
We include the results of the simulations detailed in the main text in the tables below. In
addition, we run simulations with two sets of varied parameters: first, we take α = 0.05,
second we take θ = 8 and τ = 5. Within the United States, estimates for the detection
rate range from 5% to 15%, and in countries with less developed testing infrastructure, the
detection rate is undoubtedly lower [37]. Because disease parameters are estimated, we use
a different estimated of the disease lifespan of COVID-19 [61]. For all simulations, we fix
R0 = 3.5.
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Supplementary Table 2: Regional Policy Simulation Results
θ τ α 
Percent
Infected
Infection
Person Days
Quarantined
Person Days
Escape
Rate
5 0 0.1 0 0.0276 1384.05 803955.61 0.0953
5 3 0.1 0 0.226 11282.19 2301413.60 0.458
5 3 0.1 0.05 0.514 25688.08 6478054.64 0.551
5 0 0.05 0 0.0684 3421.10 11231131.73 0.225
5 3 0.05 0 2.81 140667.17 20297075.03 0.623
5 3 0.05 0.05 7.80 390155.83 66067046.93 0.706
8 0 0.1 0 0.0277 2213.92 1243574.65 0.0904
8 5 0.1 0 0.285 22834.58 4187189.53 0.506
8 5 0.1 0.05 0.559 44709.41 10653981.92 0.582
Results for the parameters used in the main text are the average over 10000 simulations. Results for
the parameters only used in this section are the average over 2500 simulations. For all simulations,
we set k = 3 and x = 1. Infection person days and quarantined person days are scaled to be per
million individuals. The escape rate is defined as the frequency with which the disease escapes the
initial quarantine.
Supplementary Table 3: Global Policy Simulation Results
θ τ α
Percent
Infected
Infection
Person Days
Quarantined
Person Days
5 3 0.1 0.0456 2278.84 4725000.00
5 3 0.05 0.0804 4019.67 4698000.00
8 5 0.1 0.0489 3914.26 7507200.00
Results for the parameters used in the main text are the average over 10000 simulations. Results for
the parameters only used in this section are the average over 2500 simulations. Infection person days
and quarantined person days are scaled to be per million individuals. There are fewer quarantined
person days on average with α = 0.05, rather than α = 0.1 as there is a greater chance of the
disease going completely undetected before dying out.
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Supplementary Table 4: Internal and Proactive Policy Simulation Results
Policy θ τ α
Percent
Infected
Infection
Person Days
Quarantined
Person Days
Fraction
Requarantined
Internal 5 3 0.1 11.85 592234.08 65634600.00 0.674
Proactive 5 3 0.1 0.630 31501.43 37816130.00 0.569
Internal 5 3 0.05 30.61 1530914.46 133060800.00 0.804
Proactive 5 3 0.05 1.93 96626.34 56930840.00 0.719
Internal 8 5 0.1 10.13 810885.33 87270880.00 0.684
Proactive 8 5 0.1 0.792 63328.75 19992240.00 0.568
Results for the parameters used in the main text are the average over 10000 simulations. Results for
the parameters only used in this section are the average over 2500 simulations. For all simulations,
every jurisdiction sets x = 1. Infection person days and quarantined person days are scaled to be
per million individuals.
Supplementary Table 5: Internal and Proactive Policies with Lax Jurisdictions Simulation Results
Policy θ τ α
Percent
Infected
Infection
Person Days
Quarantined
Person Days
Fraction
Requarantined
Low Threshold
Case Fraction
Internal 5 3 0.1 20.94 1046945.43 102106475.00 0.728 0.842
Proactive 5 3 0.1 2.73 136557.93 41470367.50 0.674 0.734
Internal 5 3 0.05 34.02 1700815.97 117682100.00 0.822 0.852
Proactive 5 3 0.05 11.64 582078.59 101899270.00 0.806 0.720
Internal 8 5 0.1 19.65 1572688.84 155807360.00 0.744 0.840
Proactive 8 5 0.1 3.23 258570.58 49832880.00 0.677 0.763
Results for the parameters used in the main text are the average over 10000 simulations. Results for
the parameters only used in this section are the average over 2500 simulations. For all simulations,
36 jurisdictions set x = 1 and the remained set x = 5. In the proactive case, jurisdictions with
x = 5 follow myopic, internal policies. Infection person days and quarantined person days are
scaled to be per million individuals.
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